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INTRODUCTION 
This brief first replies to defendant Jana Potter's arguments in response to the 
Dishingers' claims as appellants, and then responds to the arguments asserted by 
Ms. Potter on her cross-appeal. For the reasons that follow, this Court should reject 
Ms. Potter's challenges to the Dishingers' assignments of error and also her claims 
as cross-appellant. 
REPLY POINTS 
A. The record fails to support Ms. Potter's assertion that the jury's verdict 
concerning the elements of accord and satisfaction was only advisory. 
Ms. Potter first argues that the Dishingers are not in a position to challenge 
the trial court's judgment that there was no accord and satisfaction on the ground 
that the court ignored the jury's undisputed findings concerning the elements of 
accord and satisfaction (as contained in the Special Verdict). Specifically, Ms,.. 
Potter contends that the jury's Special Verdict was advisory only and therefore not 
binding on the trial court. The record, however, fails to support that contention. 
Most significant is that the judgment itself makes clear that the trial court 
entered judgment based on the findings made by the jury in its Special Verdict. In 
the very first paragraph of the judgment, the court states: "Based upon the evidence 
and the special verdict, the Court enters judgment as follows[.]" Br. of Appellants, 
Addendum B (emphasis added). And throughout the judgment, the trial court refers 
to specific findings made by the jury and simply applies the law to those findings 
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(see Addendum B to Brief of Appellants). The trial court made no independent 
findings of fact. 
Moreover, nothing in the record even suggests that either the trial court or 
the parties believed the jury was sitting in an advisory capacity. The Dishingers 
made a proper and timely demand for a jury trial. (R. 35). The parties did not 
stipulate to a bench trial of any issues. Nor did they ever seek to limit the issues the 
jury would consider. Furthermore, the trial court did not "upon motion or its own 
initiative fmd[] that a right of trial by jury of some or all * * * issues d[id] not 
exist." Utah R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2). The proceedings went forward as if the entire case 
were being tried to the jury as a matter of right, and the matter was consistently 
designated as a jury trial on the official court records (e.g., the numerous minute 
entries regarding scheduling and conduct of the trial, and documents relating to the 
post-trial proceedings, including the judgment itself: "This matter came on before 
the Court for a jury trial * * *."). (R. 234-40, 264, 300, 304, 341-42, 412-13, 605). 
Also, the jury was specifically instructed: "You are the exclusive judges of the facts 
and the evidence." (R. 304). 
Accordingly, this Court should reject Ms. Potter's "advisory jury" argument 
for essentially the same reasons that it rejected a similar claim in Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Assocs., 896 P.2d 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Goldberg, after 
receiving an unfavorable verdict from the jury, the plaintiffs argued for the first 
time in a post-trial memorandum that "because the case involved only equitable 
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issues, the jury had served in an advisory capacity." 896 P.2d at 1241. Convinced 
by that argument, the trial judge ignored the jury's verdict (considering it to be 
nonbinding), made its own findings of fact (which were contrary to the jury's 
verdict), and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 1242. 
On appeal, this Court, construing Rule 39 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, held that the trial court had erred in designating the jury's verdict as 
advisory and ruling contrary to that verdict. Id. at 1244. In so holding, the Court 
noted that both parties had demanded a jury trial without limiting their demand to 
particular claims, the trial court had not "'upon motion or its own initiative f[ound] 
that a right of trial by jury of some or all * * * issues d[id] not exist,' Utah R.Civ.P. 
39(a)(2)," "the proceedings [had gone] forward as if the entire case were being tried 
by a jury as a matter of right," on the official court forms the matter was 
consistently referred to as a jury trial, and neither the parties nor the trial court had 
sought to limit the issues to be decided by the jury. Id. at 1243. The Goldberg 
Court also noted that the jury had been "specifically instructed that it was the 
exclusive judge of the facts." Id. All of the foregoing considerations apply with 
equal force to the instant case. 
The Goldberg Court also observed that the trial court's failure to notify the 
parties at the outset of trial that the jury's verdict would be advisory prohibited it 
from treating the verdict in that fashion once a verdict had been returned. Id. at 
-3-
1243-44. The absence of such notification in the instant case similarly precludes 
the "advisory jury" argument that Ms. Potter advances. 
Goldberg and the instant case are distinguishable from Peirce v. Peirce, 
2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193, which Ms. Potter relies on as support for her position. In 
Peirce, the sole claim before the trial court was an equitable claim, and it was clear 
on the face of the record that the trial court had treated the jury's findings as 
advisory only. Indeed, the trial court actually entered separate findings of fact. 
2000 UT 7, fflf 14-15. In short, this Court's conclusion in Peirce that the jury was 
sitting in an advisory capacity was based on factors not present in either Goldberg 
or the instant case. 
In sum, contrary to Ms. Potter's argument, the jury's Special Verdict cannot 
be considered advisory only. The trial court was bound by the jury's factual 
determinations concerning the elements of accord and satisfaction, as contained in 
the Special Verdict. See Goldberg, 896 P.2d at 1244 ("even if the trial court had 
been responsible for deciding equitable issues in this case, it would have been 
bound by the jury's factual determination[s] [concerning those issues]"). The 
Dishingers therefore are in a position to challenge the trial court's judgment on the 
ground that it is contrary to the jury's findings concerning the elements of accord 
and satisfaction. 
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B. The Dishingers preserved their claim of accord and satisfaction, and 
that claim does not require them to satisfy the marshalling requirement. 
Without analysis and in cursory fashion, Ms. Potter contends that this Court 
should not review the Dishingers' accord and satisfaction claim because (1) their 
brief fails to demonstrate that they preserved that claim in the trial court and (2) 
they have failed to meet the marshalling requirement for an insufficiency-of-
evidence claim. Br. of Appellee 9-10. As explained below, in making that 
argument, Ms. Potter has overlooked the Dishingers' citations to the record and 
misconstrued the marshalling requirement. 
Citing Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ms. 
Potter asserts that "[t]he Dishingers' Brief fails to support that [the accord and 
satisfaction] issue[] w[as] preserved for review[.]" Br. of Appellee 9. To the 
contrary, the Dishingers' brief contains specific citations to the record where the 
accord and satisfaction issue was preserved. Br. of Appellants 1. Ms. Potter 
mounts no challenge to the sufficiency or accuracy of those citations. Accordingly, 
this Court should summarily reject her Rule 24(a)(5)(A) argument. 
Ms. Potter's marshalling argument fares no better. The marshalling 
requirement applies only where an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support findings of fact. See, e.g., Dejavne, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 
1999 UT App 355, ffl[ 12-14, 993 P.2d 222 (to obtain appellate review of a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a factual finding, the party 
making that challenge must marshal all of the record evidence in support of the 
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finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding). The Dishingers are not making a sufficiency-of-evidence claim with 
respect to the accord and satisfaction issue. Rather, they simply are arguing that the 
trial court erred in entering judgment against them on the accord and satisfaction 
claim, given the jury's undisputed findings of fact in its Special Verdict. See Br. of 
Appellants 9-13. That is a pure question of law, which in no way raises a 
sufficiency-of-evidence issue. Thus, the marshalling requirement is inapplicable to 
the Dishingers. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, n. 4, 994 P.2d 193 ("the 
marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to 
conclusions of law"). Their accord and satisfaction issue is properly presented for 
review. 
C. There was an accord and satisfaction between the parties, which set the 
rental rate at $19 per square foot, and Ms. Potter's subjective intent 
regarding the accord and satisfaction is irrelevant. 
In responding to the merits of the Dishingers' accord and satisfaction 
argument, Ms. Potter does not dispute their assertion that all of the elements of an 
accord and satisfaction were established by the evidence and found by the jury: (1) 
the applicable rental rate was not a liquidated or set dollar amount, and there was a 
bona fide dispute or uncertainty regarding the applicable rental rate; (2) the 
Dishingers tendered payment to Ms. Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed 
monthly rental amount; and (3) Ms. Potter was on notice of the tendered payment 
by the Dishingers and accepted it. Rather, she contends that there could be no 
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accord and satisfaction because she did not subjectively intend for that to occur. 
That contention, however, is defeated by this Court's holding in Cove View 
Excavating & Construction Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a case 
cited by Ms. Potter. 
In Cove View, the parties had a dispute regarding the amount owed for the 
purchase of construction materials and the rental of a pump and a backhoe. The 
debtor submitted a check to the creditor with "pmt in full to date labor & materials" 
written on the front, and "payment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84" 
written on the back. 758 P.2d at 476. On the advice of counsel, the creditor crossed 
out the restrictive language on the back of the check and negotiated it. Id. As does 
Ms. Potter in the instant case, the creditor claimed that it had not subjectively 
consented to accept an amount less than the full amount demanded as payment in 
full. In rejecting the creditor's argument, and ruling that an accord and satisfaction 
had indeed occurred, this Court explained: 
In light of the express condition on the check, the fact that [the creditor] did 
not subjectively intend to accept the check as full payment of [the debtor's] 
obligation is legally irrelevant. A creditor may not disregard the condition 
attached to a check tendered in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed 
claim. His negotiation of [the debtor's] check was an acceptance of [the 
debtor's] offer of full payment, notwithstanding his lack of any actual intent 
to accept it as such. 
"The fact that the creditor scratches out the words 'in full payment,' or other 
similar words indicating that the payment is tendered in full satisfaction, 
does not prevent his retention of the money from operating as an assent to 
the discharge . . . . It may, indeed, be clear that he does not in fact assent to 
the offer made by the debtor, so that there is no actual 'meeting of the 
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minds.' But this is merely another illustration of the fact that the making of a 
contract frequently does not require such an actual meeting." 
* * * * 
[The creditor's] negotiation of this check resulted in an accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of his subjective intent. 
Id. at 478 (quoting 6 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1279 (1962)) (citations 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly ruled that a party's subjective intent is 
irrelevant in light of the party's actual conduct with respect to an accord and 
satisfaction: 
As adopted in this jurisdiction, the doctrine [of accord and satisfaction] does 
not require subjective intent to discharge an obligation, provided the parties' 
actions give rise to a reasonable inference that they accepted the altered 
performance of their contract. Where, as here, the check is tendered under 
the condition that negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation 
of the check constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent 
to negate the condition. 
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 330 (Utah 1992). 
In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the creditor's 
negotiation of the check tendered as payment in full satisfied the debtor's 
obligation, regardless of the creditor's subjective intent that the check be considered 
only a partial payment and the creditor's efforts to recover the full amount through 
litigation: 
While it is true that, as with any contract, the parties must consent to an 
accord and satisfaction, a party's conduct may be conclusive proof of 
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acceptance nc:c, i^ru, JICUUOI :ij negouauon oi'tiic uicu\ * in istituted 
i cL 
Tn contrast, in Tates, Inc. v. „Ii///e America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 
(I Itah 1/975), i elied upon b> I"\ Is. Pottei for the propositioi i. til: lat i i.o accoi d ai id 
,.:,. . ; j ' u * , , , : \ e d a m o u n t , and a l though s o m e 
discussions had occurred with respect to possible effect- \o the amount due, the 
creditor was not on notice that the subject payment was tendered as payment i;, '... 1 
of tl le obligatic i I ;' i i at 1 230 31 Ix lo si I ::1 I facts are present i;t i tl le ii istai it ca se 
Allen-Howe Specialties v. U.S. Construction, Inc., o i l P.2d "!*ML'uh ! -1**-,, 
another case relied upon by Ms. Potter, also is distinguishable from the instant case. 
Ii I All en H o\ t >e, p »
 ( ^UIL^N I * ed si n i i * 21 e paid pi 11 si mi it t :) a 
written contract, all of which contained a restrictive endorsement to the effectjjiat 
negotiation of the check constituted payment in full for all labor, materials and 
equipment pi. - .^.*; ;> ,;.-.. , . • . •* -. - v: 
t] < ; { i the debtor for collection of the full debt. A l t h c ^ ^ the 
Utah Supreme ( nun iiut PI t discuss each and every element of an accord and 
satisfaction, . .. . .* ;.,....,.. , paymen 
the attempted final payment of the fixed sum, did not constitute an accord and 
satisfactioi • \. ..k-> * -Hhn Hnwc. in the instant case rather than a fixed sum,, 
being duv. a,.w ^ m L . . mere was a bona Iide dispute «»u'i 11 R: attiuil iiiiii njiii I n ii 
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the Dishingers owed to Ms. Potter. Additionally, unlike in Allen-Howe, Ms. Potter 
never refused a single payment made by the Dishingers. 
Finally, Ms. Potter's assertion that "the lease provides that acceptance of 
partial rent could not constitute an accord and satisfaction," Br. of Appellee 12, is 
based on a misreading of the lease. The language from the lease that Ms. Potter 
quotes and relies on, Br. of Appellee 12, provides that the landlord's acceptance of 
rent "shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any preceding default by tenant or any 
term, covenant or condition of the lease, other than the failure of Tenant to pay 
particular rent also accepted[.]" Br. of Appellant, Addendum C (page 19 of Lease). 
That language, although not entirely clear, cannot reasonably be read to preclude an 
accord and satisfaction, which, of course, presumes a bona fide dispute over an 
unliquidated amount (here, the "then prevailing rental rate"), a payment tendered in 
full settlement of the entire dispute, and an acceptance of the payment. Estate 
Landscape, 844 P.2d at 325 (setting forth the elements of accord and satisfaction). 
In sum, nothing in the law or the facts of this case supports Ms. Potter's 
contention that an accord and satisfaction did not, or could not, occur. Indeed, the 
only fair reading of the Special Verdict - viewed in the light of established case law 
- is that the jury found an accord and satisfaction between the parties with respect 
to the rental rate for the option period provided for in the lease. And the trial court 
simply was not in a position to ignore that finding in entering judgment. 
-10-
i"1" IN Is. Potter fails to show that the lease between her and the Dishingei s 
'
1
 i 'as forfeited for purposes of the unlawful detainer statute. 
j n r e S p 0 n s e to the Dishingers' argument that the trial court erred in entering a 
judgment against them, for unlawful detainer and treble damages '* • Gutter 
contends that, contrar) to lli» I iishingci « |>imu|ul , i ni tin1 lease hM\v<vn iln 
pat ties "vv as foi feited i.e., tei i ninated - under the terms of the lease. Although she 
never expressly makes the point, she apparently is of the view that termination of 
the lease under the "Remedies •< . * ) . .. SLVL..: * , , s, 
A ' - i s • •• a judgment for unlawful 
detainer and treble damages, e\ en though she accepted mv from the Dishingers 
after serving a notice to pay or quit. As further explainer i^Wi\\. however, 
view t> liicoinin I, IKIIIUM ii Kill;. I<> uni'i'iiIn eoiil - '.* Utah 
Supreme Court concerning the effect of post-notice -to-qail acceptance of rent ,^ 
payments on a landlord's ability to obtain relief including treble damages - under 
Utal i '*Ui A\ r« M - letaii \ei I: i * < (I J I \ I l O : H XI :AN N §§ 78- 36 3 thi < >i igl l 11 (1996)) 
Ms. •' •*-•• -trends considerable time in her brief discussing the non-'A ur •:: 
and ».Mii.;die^-tor-defauH provisions of the lease. Br. of Appellee 1 2- io+ 
discussion, how e\ er, is : . • v ant to tl le Dishii lgers' assignn lent • *j • 
that the trial court erred in entering a judgment for unlaw ful detainer and treble 
damages pursuant to statute, even though Ms. Potter accepted rent from the 
] • . . . . •",., - c i v :I'IL 
1 -1'. - >* - • .* ,L waive any tenant default b^ accepting rent after h 
. 1 1 . 
default and thus does not waive the right to seek whatever contractual remedies she 
may have for the default - an interpretation of the lease with which the Dishingers 
do not disagree - is unimportant insofar as the unlawful detainer statute is 
concerned. What controls for purposes of applying the statutory law is the clear 
principle set forth in Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABCIntermountain Theatres, Inc., 
560 P.2d 700, 701-02 (Utah 1977), that in order to pursue the statutory remedies of 
unlawful detainer and treble damages, a landlord may not accept rent - even partial 
rent - after serving a notice to quit on a tenant. Interestingly, Ms. Potter neither 
challenges the Dishingers' statement of the Woodland Theatres rule nor explains 
why it does not apply in this case to defeat the judgment against the Dishingers for 
unlawful detainer and treble damages. 
At bottom, as fully discussed in the Dishingers' opening brief, under 
Woodland Theatres, Ms. Potter waived forfeiture of the lease for purposes of the 
unlawful detainer statute (and its provision for treble damages) when she accepted 
rent payments from the Dishingers after serving them with a notice to quit. After 
she had accepted rent, Ms. Potter simply was not in a position to pursue the 
statutory remedies (without reinitiating the statutory process by serving a new 
notice to quit). 
That is not to say that Ms. Potter was without potential contractual remedies 
for eviction and damages under the terms of the lease; however, those remedies 
were independent of the statutory remedies. And contrary to the implicit suggestion 
-12-
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damages is i lot si istainable i n ider tl le tei i i: is of the lease. Specifically, with respect 
to the treble damages award, although the remedies provisions contained in the 
lease permit, the landlord to recover damages from uic tenai,. .. ; .: .. ..iuu n c -•» 
of \ ppellai it Addei ixii n i: 1 C, pages 13 1 1 of I ' < * for treble 
damages. Thus, the trial court's treble damages award w hich clearly is the 
Dishingers' principal concern in this appeal - cannot be saver; by M*. lot : i .. 
lease-based, analysis. 
RESPONSE rO MS. POT I ER'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
ON CROSS-APPEAL 
A. Ms. Potter fails to show that the trial court erred in refusing to give h^r 
requested ju rv instructions concerning thr meaning of "prevailing rn 
rate." 
In her first assignment of error on cross-appeal, Ms. Potter argues that j;lie 
trial court erred in refusing to give her requested jury instnictions on the meaning of 
"prevailing rei.;.*. .... -
 t . n - • 
ni i r i iln) mil i"ii in declining -*~ rive the requested instructions. 
Ms. Potter acknowledges that the jury was presented with a fact question as 
tot;.,
 ti\U \cai mciimriL . * . . 
bduecn the parties (Br. of Appellants, Addendum C, page 24 of Lease). There is 
no dispute that the parties offered competing and contradictory evidence on that 
question a* H... .. . j ^ ; , ;^ ; - J..-;J : • •* *- - -
1
 "ipi'HiiliYl -1 .- •-• -"i:\ir - vntal rah1" meant the most frequent or 
prevalent rate, not the market rate, and that her own evidence supported the contrary 
view that "prevailing rental rate" meant market rate. Br. of Appellee 17-18. 
Given the competing positions concerning the meaning of "prevailing rental 
rate," the trial court correctly refused to give Potter's requested instructions. See 
Vitale v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("A trial court's 
decision regarding jury instructions presents a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correctness."). Those instructions were nothing more than a directive to the jury 
to adopt Ms. Potter's proposed interpretation of the disputed term over the 
Dishingers' proposed interpretation of that term. The instructions therefore were 
obviously improper, if the jury was to function as it should in deciding a fact 
question - i.e., by giving due consideration to all the evidence and the views of both 
parties. Indeed, the requested instructions, by directing the jury to adopt Ms. 
Potter's view of the evidence, would have constituted improper comment on the 
evidence by the judge. See State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 109-10 (Utah 1985) ("In 
the context of the specific evidence relating to these items, the "factors" 
propounded by the defendant [in his requested jury instruction] would have unduly 
emphasized portions of the testimony and would have been an improper comment 
by the judge on the evidence."). In short, Ms. Potter's first assignment of error is 
without merit. 
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Ms. Potter fails to demonstrate that she fait ly presented her argument 
concerning administrative and late fees to the trial court; therefore, this 
Court should not consider that argument 
As a second assignment of error, Ms. Potter argues - somewhat confusingly 
*^* the trial court erred in not awarding her aamnisinr \\ c and late fees she 
parties. Br. of Appellee 20-22. Ms. Potior, however, fails to show that she 
presented I; :' «• TT :ai cnuri ilv argument she m*v\ makes -n appeal For that reason, 
The r /lo citation to the record that Ms. Potter provides this Court as 
evidence of"preservation of h. r argument concerning administrative and late fees is 
• ^ ;i r \ppeliec ..*, ^ *KLI:^  n » \* .: page ..\ . -
ti - ••- •" • *• " u - "•• •- • " b ictusal to tr^ i 
certain of her requested jur} instructions (No?*. "'\ W. 22, and 21). Thus. •• *• 
unclear whether Ms. Potter is arguing dial she i.> ciii-iicu 10 a reversai oi a portion ^ -i 
the n ul rnun ri pid/meni on inr jnound mill llir rmiii n lonnui^h infused IO<M\ < 
her requested jury instructions on administrative and late fees, or that such a 
reversal should come because the trial court itself should have awarded those fees. 
In the "Issues and Standards on Review" section of Ms. Potter's brief, she refers 
to "R. 634, f 16" as the record support for preservation of her argument concerning 
administrative and late fees. Br. of Appellee 3. That citation, however, appears to 
be a typographical error, and thus the Dishingers will assume that Potter mea : ' 
refer the Court to "R. 637," as set forth in the argument portion of her brief (Br, of 
Appellee 21). The Dishingers also will assume that Ms. Potter's citationstr^ "<" • "M 
and "p. 16" are meant to refer to line 16 of the referenced page. 
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In any event, regardless of which argument Ms. Potter actually is making, she fails 
to demonstrate that the argument was preserved below. 
"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Salt Lake County v. Carls ton, 776 P.2d 653, 
655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If an issue was not brought to the attention of the trial 
court in a timely and informative manner, it is "deemed waived, precluding this 
court from considering [the] merits on appeal." Id. Nothing but a cursory objection 
to four of Ms. Potter's requested instructions (the specific texts of which are not 
identified) appears in the paragraph beginning at line 16 of record page 637 - the 
citation to the record provided by Ms. Potter. That objection concerning essentially 
unidentified instructions is wholly insufficient to preserve for review the argument 
regarding administrative and late fees that Ms. Potter now presents on appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in the Dishingers' 
opening brief, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment of unlawful 
detainer and treble damages against the Dishingers, and remand the case to the trial 
court for (1) entry of judgment in favor of the Dishingers on their accord and 
satisfaction claim (or, alternatively, on the ground that Ms. Potter - for purposes of 
the unlawful detainer statute - waived forfeiture of the lease by accepting rent after 
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sei v ing a notice to qi lit) at id (2) calculation and award of the Dishii lgers' reasonable 
attorney 's fee s at ti ial and c i: i appeal 
Dated this 20th day of September, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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